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Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L): 5 FORCES Analysis [Apr-2026 Updated] |
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Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L) Bundle
Phoenix Group sits at the crossroads of scale and disruption: its vast £280bn asset base and century-spanning brands give it defensive strengths, yet concentrated suppliers, fierce rivals in annuities and workplace pensions, rising substitutes from fintech and DIY platforms, and heavy regulatory and capital barriers all shape razor-edged strategic choices - read on to explore how each of Porter's Five Forces squeezes opportunities and risks for PHNX.L.
Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers
Phoenix Group's supplier base exerts materially high bargaining power across multiple domains-asset management, reinsurance, technology and regulatory services-driven by concentration, specialized capabilities and mandatory nature of services. Supplier pricing and capacity constraints have direct impact on operating costs, capital efficiency and net cash generation.
Asset management fees drive operational costs. Phoenix manages approximately £280,000,000,000 in assets under administration (AUA) as of late 2025 and relies heavily on external investment managers. Abrdn manages a significant portion of these assets while the remaining c.35% is diversified across other global managers. Fee structures for these managers typically range between 10 and 20 basis points depending on asset-class complexity. Phoenix reported an operating cost base of £850,000,000 in 2025 where investment management expenses represent c.25% of total administrative outgoings (≈£212,500,000). Concentration among a few Tier 1 providers limits Phoenix's ability to pivot without incurring significant transition costs and potential market impact.
| Metric | Value / Notes |
|---|---|
| Assets under administration (AUA) | £280,000,000,000 (late 2025) |
| Share managed by Abrdn | ~65% of externally managed assets (material portion) |
| Remaining external managers | ~35% diversified across global managers |
| Investment management fee range | 10-20 basis points (0.10%-0.20%) |
| Operating cost base | £850,000,000 (2025) |
| Investment management expense | £212,500,000 (≈25% of admin costs) |
Reinsurance capacity influences capital management efficiency. Phoenix cedes over £15,000,000,000 of liabilities to external reinsurers to manage longevity risk and Solvency II capital requirements. The longevity swap and large-scale reinsurance market is dominated by ~6 major global reinsurers, who set pricing according to internal risk appetite. Phoenix reported a Solvency II surplus of £3,900,000,000 in 2025 which is sensitive to premium movements; a 12% increase in reinsurance premiums over the last fiscal year materially affected capital costs. Phoenix targets a solvency coverage ratio of c.170% and depends on reinsurer capacity to hit that objective. Reinsurance premium increases and capacity tightening have direct consequences for net cash generation, which reached a target of £1,400,000,000 in 2025.
| Metric | Value / Notes |
|---|---|
| Liabilities ceded to reinsurers | £15,000,000,000+ |
| Number of dominant reinsurers | ~6 global reinsurers |
| Solvency II surplus | £3,900,000,000 (2025) |
| Solvency coverage ratio target | ~170% |
| Reinsurance premium change (YoY) | +12% (last fiscal year) |
| Net cash generation | £1,400,000,000 (2025) |
Technology providers control the pace and cost of digital transformation. Phoenix is executing a multi-year digital strategy with a £200,000,000 investment in cloud infrastructure and platform consolidation. Key IT vendors (e.g., TCS Diligenta) administer over 10,000,000 policies across legacy and new business books. Switching costs are prohibitive: migration would require moving datasets in excess of 50 petabytes and could disrupt customer service metrics targeted at 95% satisfaction. Current IT vendor contracts account for c.15% of the £1,200,000,000 annual operating expenditure budget (≈£180,000,000). Long-term vendor contracts often include inflation-linked escalators and clause structures that reinforce supplier leverage due to specialized knowledge of closed-book systems.
- Digital transformation capex: £200,000,000 (multi-year)
- Policy administration volume managed by vendors: >10,000,000 policies
- Data migration scale: >50 petabytes
- IT spend share of OPEX: ~15% of £1,200,000,000 (≈£180,000,000)
- Customer satisfaction target at risk during transitions: 95%
Regulatory compliance services demand high premiums. Oversight by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) requires comprehensive actuarial, audit and reporting services costing upwards of £45,000,000 annually. The Big Four accounting and advisory firms are effectively the only firms capable of auditing and advising a FTSE insurer with c.£300,000,000,000 in assets (note Phoenix asset figures can be presented as AUA and wider group balance metrics). Phoenix allocates approximately 5% of senior management time to regulatory reporting obligations, and specialized Solvency II/UK reporting software suppliers increased prices by ~8% in the past year. High barriers to entry and the mandatory nature of these services ensure sustained pricing power for these suppliers.
| Metric | Value / Notes |
|---|---|
| Annual actuarial & audit cost | £45,000,000+ |
| Relevant auditors/advisors | Predominantly Big Four firms |
| Group assets referenced | c.£300,000,000,000 (scale for audit requirements) |
| Management time on regulatory reporting | ~5% of senior management time |
| Specialized software price inflation | +8% (year) |
Overall supplier leverage is high across these categories due to concentration, regulatory mandatory services, large-scale data and system complexity, and limited alternative capacity for longevity risk transfer. These supplier dynamics increase Phoenix's operating leverage and capital management sensitivity to supplier-driven cost and capacity changes.
Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers
Institutional clients demand competitive buyout pricing. The Bulk Purchase Annuity (BPA) market is highly competitive with Phoenix competing for mandates that often exceed £1,000m per transaction. Large pension trustees represent c.60% of Phoenix's new business growth through the Retirement Solutions division. In 2025 Phoenix achieved £6,000m in BPA volumes while maintaining a disciplined internal rate of return (IRR) target of 15% to remain an attractive counterparty. Competitive bidding processes across multiple insurers have compressed new business margins by approximately 40 basis points over the last 24 months, reducing pricing autonomy for Phoenix.
Market transparency enables trustees to compare quotes across the eight major BPA providers, shortening procurement cycles and increasing pressure on Phoenix to match or undercut market-leading pricing. The following table summarises key institutional bargaining metrics:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Phoenix 2025 BPA volume | £6,000m |
| Typical mandate size | £1,000m+ |
| Institutional contribution to new business growth | 60% |
| Required IRR for mandates | 15% |
| Margin compression (24 months) | 40 bps |
| Number of comparable BPA providers | 8 |
Retail policyholders benefit from platform transparency and regulatory protections. Workplace savings assets under Phoenix's administration amount to c.£40,000m, and customer mobility has increased with pension dashboard initiatives. Average churn in the UK life insurance sector has risen to c.7% as digital platforms facilitate easier comparison of fund performance and charges. Phoenix must keep workplace pension charges below the 0.75% cap while competing with low-cost providers offering fees as low as 0.30%.
To address digital and service expectations Phoenix invested an incremental £50m this year to upgrade digital interfaces across its retail platforms. The group serves over 12m total customers and faces heightened oversight from the Financial Ombudsman Service, which eases exit for dissatisfied policyholders and amplifies customer bargaining power.
Key retail metrics:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Workplace savings assets | £40,000m |
| Total customers | 12,000,000+ |
| Average churn (sector) | 7% |
| Workplace charge cap | 0.75% |
| Lowest competitor fees | 0.30% |
| Incremental digital spend (current year) | £50m |
| Retail annual recurring revenue at risk | £1,500m |
Intermediary influence shapes distribution channel success. Financial advisers and employee benefit consultants direct approximately 75% of new retail business into Phoenix's Standard Life brand. Intermediaries demand high service levels and competitive commission structures, which account for a significant portion of the group's c.£300m distribution costs.
If Phoenix loses a 4-star provider rating from key consultant panels, advisers can reallocate billions in assets within a single quarter. The group's distribution dependence is reflected in its £2,000m annual net flow target for the workplace segment. Intermediaries leverage their aggregated client bases to negotiate improved terms and broader fund ranges from Phoenix, increasing bargaining power and pressuring margin and product design.
Distribution and intermediary metrics:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Share of new retail business via intermediaries | 75% |
| Annual distribution costs | £300m |
| Workplace annual net flow target | £2,000m |
| Assets movable by adviser shifts (single quarter) | £billions |
| Standard Life adviser rating threshold | 4-star |
Switching costs decrease with regulatory shifts. Consumer Duty regulations have forced Phoenix to simplify fee structures and remove exit charges on certain legacy products, lowering barriers for customers to migrate portions of the group's c.£280,000m assets. Phoenix reports that 15% of its legacy book is now subject to enhanced annual value-for-money reviews; failure to meet benchmarks could trigger customer outflows.
The rise of automated switching services has increased the volume of partial transfers out of traditional pension products by c.10%, magnifying the speed at which assets can move between providers. As switching frictions fall, Phoenix must invest heavily in retention strategies-digital engagement, targeted proposition redesign and pricing-to protect its c.£1,500m annual recurring revenue stream from retail operations.
Switching and regulatory metrics:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total assets under management/administration | £280,000m |
| Legacy book under enhanced review | 15% |
| Increase in partial transfers (automated switching) | 10% |
| Retail ARR at stake | £1,500m |
| Regulatory action affecting exit charges | Removal/simplification mandated |
- Institutional customers: concentrated buying power, large mandate influence, price-driven procurement.
- Retail customers: scale and digital mobility increase churn risk and cap pricing flexibility.
- Intermediaries: gatekeepers of distribution with commission and rating leverage.
- Regulation: reduces switching costs and enforces transparency, accelerating asset mobility.
Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry
Market concentration intensifies in the BPA sector. Phoenix competes directly with giants like Legal & General and Aviva in a UK bulk purchase annuity (BPA) market that recorded £50.0bn in total volume during 2025. Phoenix holds an estimated 12% market share in this segment but faces intense pressure from rivals with larger balance sheets and stronger credit ratings. Competition for high-quality credit assets to back these annuities has driven yields down by c.25 basis points across the industry, compressing actuarial margins and forcing pricing discipline. The requirement to deploy capital efficiently to meet Phoenix's £1.4bn cash generation target has increased rivalry intensity and shortened deal timelines, pushing Phoenix to innovate in deal structuring and liability management to preserve returns.
Workplace savings competition squeezes management margins. The workplace pension market remains a primary growth engine where Phoenix's Standard Life brand competes against Master Trust providers and large platform operators. Competitors such as Nest and The People's Pension have captured a combined c.20% of the UK auto-enrolment market, applying downward pressure on fee income. Phoenix currently manages c.£55.0bn in workplace assets but faces constant margin compression from rivals offering lower administrative fees and scale-driven pricing models. The industry-wide shift toward ESG-integrated funds has required Phoenix to transition c.80% of its default funds into sustainable mandates to align with market expectations and preserve net flows. This competitive dynamic has produced a c.5% annual increase in marketing and brand development spend to defend the Standard Life franchise and customer retention rates.
Consolidation of legacy books limits acquisition opportunities. The UK closed-book consolidator market has matured, with Phoenix and ReAssure together controlling over 60% of the heritage life and pensions market. Rivalry for the remaining c.£100.0bn of outsourceable legacy assets is intense; few large-scale portfolios remain available for acquisition. Private equity-backed competitors such as Sixth Street and Apollo, with lower cost-of-capital profiles, compete aggressively for complex portfolios. This competition has elevated acquisition multiples from c.0.7x to nearly 0.9x of Solvency II Own Funds over the last three years, increasing the capital required per transaction and reducing prospective returns. As a result, Phoenix has shifted focus toward organic growth, which currently accounts for c.50% of new business value (NBV).
Digital transformation serves as a key differentiator. Market participants are investing heavily in technology to improve customer retention and operational efficiency; rivals are estimated to spend a combined c.£1.5bn annually on UK insurance technology. Phoenix's operating cost base of c.£850m is regularly benchmarked against leaner, digital-first competitors that operate with approximately 20% lower cost-to-income ratios. The group's ability to sustain a c.170% Solvency II ratio is contingent on realising c.£250m in annual cost synergies through platform integration and process automation. Competitors increasingly deploy AI-driven claims automation and straight-through processing, improving industry-wide settlement times by c.30%, and creating migration risk for Phoenix's c.12.0m customers if platform modernisation lags.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| UK BPA market volume (2025) | £50.0bn |
| Phoenix BPA market share | 12% |
| Industry yield compression on credit assets | 25 bps |
| Phoenix cash generation target | £1.4bn |
| Workplace assets under management (Phoenix) | £55.0bn |
| Auto-enrolment market share (Nest + People's Pension) | 20% |
| Default funds transitioned to ESG mandates (Phoenix) | 80% |
| Incremental marketing spend increase | 5% p.a. |
| Share of UK heritage market (Phoenix + ReAssure) | >60% |
| Remaining outsourceable legacy assets | £100.0bn |
| Acquisition multiples (Solvency II own funds) | 0.7x → 0.9x (3 years) |
| New business value from organic growth | 50% |
| Annual industry IT spend (UK insurers) | £1.5bn |
| Phoenix operating cost base | £850m |
| Target annual cost synergies | £250m |
| Cost-to-income gap vs digital-first rivals | ~20% |
| Phoenix solvency ratio | ~170% |
| Customer base | 12.0m |
Strategic implications and competitive actions required:
- Enhance deal structuring capabilities to secure BPA transactions at tighter spreads while protecting capital returns.
- Defend workplace margins via service-level differentiation, modular pricing, and targeted client retention programmes for Standard Life.
- Prioritise high-conviction legacy acquisitions and partnerships to mitigate elevated multiples; increase focus on organic NBV growth.
- Accelerate digital platform integration and AI-driven automation to realise £250m cost synergies and close the 20% cost-to-income gap.
- Maintain asset-liability management discipline to protect solvency metrics amid compression in annuity yields and higher acquisition costs.
Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes
Direct investment platforms bypass traditional insurance: Retail investors are reallocating capital to DIY platforms such as Hargreaves Lansdown and AJ Bell, which together manage in excess of £200bn in UK assets. These platforms typically charge platform fees often below 0.45% versus traditional advised insurance products that can exceed 1.0% total ongoing charges. Phoenix's retail Assets Under Administration (AUA) of ~£40bn is therefore exposed to outflows into Self-Invested Personal Pensions (SIPPs) and platforms offering lower friction and costs. The consumer preference for 24/7 digital access and lower fees has driven an estimated 12% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in the UK direct-to-consumer (D2C) platform market over recent years.
Key comparative metrics:
| Metric | Traditional Insurance/Advised Products | Direct Investment Platforms (Hargreaves/Lansdowne style) |
|---|---|---|
| Typical Ongoing Fee | >1.0% (including advice & policy charges) | <0.45% platform fee; trading commissions variable |
| Average AUA per provider (examples) | Phoenix retail AUA ~£40bn (group total) | Hargreaves Lansdown + AJ Bell combined >£200bn |
| Market growth rate | Insurer retail flows broadly flat/low-single-digit CAGR | D2C platform market ~12% CAGR |
| Customer access model | Advisor-assisted / product centric | 24/7 digital self-service |
Responses and vulnerabilities:
- Phoenix is investing in digital capabilities and user journeys to retain savers and convert workplace clients into platform-like experiences.
- Persistence of higher advice-linked fees makes retention of older, advice-seeking cohorts easier, but structural migration of younger cohorts remains a material risk.
- Estimated at-risk retail AUA migrating to SIPPs over a 5-year horizon: 10-20% (c.£4-8bn) under base-to-high substitution scenarios.
Alternative retirement products challenge annuity dominance: Pension Drawdown is now the default for many retirees; lifetime annuities represent roughly 15% of retirement income choices. Phoenix's annuity-focused earnings - supporting approximately £6bn annual operating BPA and recurring annuity inflows - face pressure from drawdown, fixed-term bonds and high-interest savings alternatives. In 2025 UK market activity showed a ~20% year-on-year rise in uptake of fixed-term bonds and high-yield savings accounts as substitutes for guaranteed income when market interest rates are comparatively elevated.
Impact table: product substitution and financial sensitivity
| Product | 2025 Change vs 2024 | Attractiveness Drivers | Implication for Phoenix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lifetime Annuities | - (market share down to 15% of retirements) | Guaranteed income, but low liquidity | Reduced new business strain on long-term locked capital; margin compression risk |
| Pension Drawdown | + (gaining share vs annuities) | Flexibility, liquidity, estate planning | Lower annuity inflows; need for drawdown-capable propositions |
| Fixed-term Bonds / High-yield Savings | +20% uptake in 2025 | Higher short-term yields when base rates are high | Temporarily divert funds from guaranteed products; product redesign required |
Strategic responses Phoenix must adopt:
- Develop hybrid products combining guaranteed elements with drawdown flexibility to protect annuity pipeline and preserve capital duration.
- Price and hedging recalibration to remain competitive when comparable fixed-rate alternatives offer attractive nominal yields.
- Product marketing repositioned to highlight longevity hedging value when inflation and interest-rate environments change.
Fintech and neo-banks capture early-stage savers: Challenger banks and fintechs (e.g., Revolut, Monzo) have expanded deposits and simple investment offerings, capturing much of the 18-35 cohort before they enter long-term insurance relationships. UK neo-bank deposits are estimated at ~£30bn in aggregate, with many platforms offering easy-access savings rates of 4%+ during high-rate cycles, directly competing with long-term insurers' perceived value proposition. The diversion of early-stage savings and short-term goals reduces the likelihood of early-career pension consolidation and risks Phoenix's workplace channel flows. The group's target of £2bn net flows is sensitive to sustained fintech market share gains among younger employees.
Risk metrics and conversion challenges:
| Metric | Value / Estimate |
|---|---|
| Neo-bank deposits (UK) | ~£30bn |
| Share of deposits in 18-35 demographic | Estimated 45-60% for neo-banks |
| Phoenix workplace segment vulnerability | Higher attrition risk among new joiners; potential 10-15% reduction in incremental employer-plan flows if fintech adoption persists |
Mitigation actions Phoenix is pursuing:
- Partnerships/APIs to integrate with payroll and fintech payroll-savings products to capture early-stage savers.
- Targeted propositions for 18-35 with low-fee, modular pension wrappers and education campaigns to increase lifetime value.
- Retention incentives and portability features for workplace schemes to compete with neo-bank simplicity.
State pension changes alter private insurance demand: Debate over UK State Pension age and benefit levels produces substitution effects: if state provision is perceived as adequate (current baseline ~£11,500 p.a.), some households may downweight private saving; conversely, reductions in state support force higher private provision but can compress disposable income and overall market size. Phoenix covers products serving c.12 million policyholders; policy shifts therefore materially affect addressable demand and revenue generation (~£1.5bn annual revenue at current mix).
Scenarios and sensitivity:
| Scenario | State Pension Outcome | Likely Private Demand Effect | Implication for Phoenix (revenue/AUA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Higher state benefit | Increase >£12,000 p.a. | Private demand softens for low-income cohorts | Potential modest contraction in revenue; downside to cross-sell of top-up products |
| Lower state benefit / later SPA | Benefit falls or SPA rises | Higher need for private supplementation among middle-income cohorts | Increased product demand but affordability constraints; mixed AUA impact |
| Stable baseline (~£11,500) | No material change | State acts as floor; private demand driven by income and demographics | Status quo revenue; strategic positioning to sell supplements remains key |
Operational imperatives tied to substitution trends:
- Product positioning: emphasize Phoenix as a supplement to state provision with targeted income solutions priced competitively.
- Scenario planning: stress-test cashflow, lapse and persistency assumptions under varying state-support outcomes and interest-rate paths.
- Distribution diversification: channel investments into D2C, employer partnerships and fintech integrations to reduce single-channel substitution risk.
Phoenix Group Holdings plc (PHNX.L) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants
High capital requirements deter potential market entrants. The UK insurance industry is governed by Solvency II and Solvency UK rules which require Phoenix to hold £3.9 billion in surplus capital. A new entrant targeting the mid-sized annuity market would typically need a minimum of £500 million in initial capital to achieve regulatory acceptance and competitive underwriting scale. Phoenix's scale - c. £280 billion in assets under management (AUM) - creates material economies of scale in investment returns, claims pooling and operational leverage that are difficult to replicate.
The estimated cost to establish a compliant regulatory framework and enterprise-grade risk management system for a life and pensions carrier is c. £50 million before writing a single policy (systems, actuarial models, compliance, external audit and initial capital buffers). These financial and fixed-cost barriers underpin a stable competitive set: historically the UK life and pensions market remains concentrated, with around 10-12 major firms controlling the bulk of closed-book and open-book business.
| Barrier | Representative Metric / Cost | Typical Impact on New Entrant |
|---|---|---|
| Regulatory surplus capital (Phoenix example) | £3.9 billion (surplus capital held) | Substantial capital buffer required to match perceived security |
| Minimum competitive entry capital | £500 million (mid-sized annuity market) | High upfront funding requirement; limits number of entrants |
| Compliance & risk platform build | £50 million (systems + governance) | Significant time and cost before revenue-generation |
| Scale (AUM) | £280 billion (Phoenix AUM) | Large cost and return advantage for incumbents |
| Marketing & brand build | £100 million+ (multi-year investment) | High customer acquisition cost to reach national awareness |
| Workplace assets under management | £55 billion (Phoenix workplace assets) | Long-term contractual lock-in and scale in auto-enrolment |
Regulatory hurdles create significant lead times. Obtaining Part 4A permissions from the FCA and PRA can take up to 24 months and requires exhaustive vetting of senior management, governance arrangements and business plans. Phoenix benefits from c.150 years of operating history and well-established regulator relationships; newcomers lack this institutional capital. Managing Phoenix's legacy scale - c.10 million policies across multiple jurisdictions - requires navigating an expansive legislative and regulatory corpus estimated at over 2,000 pages of UK-specific insurance law.
New entrants must also implement ongoing reporting frameworks such as Consumer Duty monitoring, which adds recurring compliance costs and governance overhead. In practice most 'new' competition in the UK life sector is from established global insurers and financial groups expanding into the market, rather than true greenfield startups, because they can amortise regulatory and systems costs across existing operations.
- Typical regulatory approval timeline: up to 24 months
- Legacy policy administration complexity: ~10 million policies
- Legislative material to interpret: ~2,000+ pages
- Ongoing monitoring regime: Consumer Duty (high reporting burden)
Brand trust and heritage are difficult to build. Phoenix operates through brands including Standard Life with c.200 years of consumer recognition in the UK. Building comparable brand equity from scratch is estimated to require marketing and distribution investment exceeding £100 million over multiple years. Consumer surveys in life insurance indicate that roughly 65% of policyholders prioritise 'financial stability' and 'reputation' when choosing a provider; Phoenix's reported solvency ratio of c.170% provides a quantifiable signal of security that new entrants cannot immediately match, especially in periods of market volatility.
Phoenix's existing retail and intermediary-facing customer base of c.12 million customers creates a data moat enabling superior risk segmentation, pricing accuracy and cross-sell economics versus a new operator reliant on sparse historical data. This customer base improves persistency, reduces acquisition payback periods and enhances capital efficiency.
- Consumer preference for reputation/stability: ~65%
- Phoenix solvency ratio: ~170%
- Customer base: ~12 million policyholders
- Estimated marketing build cost for comparable brand: £100m+
Distribution network access is controlled by incumbents. The UK advisory channel (c.5,000+ independent financial advisers) typically favours established platforms and back-office integrations. Phoenix has integrated with major adviser systems through multi-year projects that required significant IT and commercial investment. A new entrant faces direct costs to integrate (software development, testing, certification) and indirect costs to persuade advisers to place client business with an unproven counterparty.
The workplace pension and auto-enrolment markets are similarly protected by long-duration contracts: many employer arrangements run 5-10 years. Phoenix already manages approximately £55 billion in workplace assets, meaning much of the 'land grab' from auto-enrolment has already been internalised by incumbents. This entrenches distribution advantage and raises the customer acquisition cost and time-to-scale for new entrants.
- Independent financial advisers in the UK: 5,000+
- Timeframe to achieve full systems integration with adviser platforms: years
- Workplace assets managed by Phoenix: £55 billion
- Common employer contract lengths: 5-10 years
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